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In this essay I will discuss the role of Jefferson in originating a misun-
derstanding of American social conflict which underlay Charles Beard's 
misunderstanding of the United States Constitution. Beard's picture of 
the Constitution as a triumph of capitalists ("personalty") over farmers 
("realty") was a version, I will contend, of the Jeffersonian mythos which 
Beard seemed triumphantly to debunk.1 
The distinction between "personalty" and "realty" emerged in a 
period when, under the influence of Populism, Turner and those like 
Beard who followed him pictured American history as a continuing con-
test between the city capitalist and the exploited farmer. But this vision 
of nature's nobleman, the yeoman farmer, fleeced and oppressed by paper 
speculators in the cities, did not appear de novo in the 1890's. The 
quest to grasp Beard runs back to Jefferson. The crux of Beard's exposi-
tion, his list of the security holdings of members of the Constitutional 
Convention, is a lineal descendant of Jefferson's 1793 "list of paper-
men."2 
What Beard did was to adopt the Jeffersonian ideology of the 1790's 
and apply it to the events of 1787-1788. Compare the following passages, 
in which Jefferson characterizes the party battles of the 1790's and Beard 
the earlier ratification struggle: 
(Jefferson) 
Trifling as are the numbers of the 
Anti-republican party, there are cir-
cumstances which give them an ap-
pearance of strength & numbers. They 
all live in cities, together, & can act in 
a body readily & at all times; they give 
chief employment to the newspapers, 
& therefore have most of them under 
their command. The Agricultural in-
terest is dispersed over a great extent 
of country, have little means of inter-
communication with each other. . . .8 
(Beard) 
Talent, wealth, and professional abili-
ties were, generally speaking, on the 
side of the Constitutionalists. They 
resided for the most part in the towns 
or the more thickly populated areas, 
and they could marshall their forces 
quickly and effectively. The money to 
be spent in the campaign of education 
was on their side also. The opposition 
on the other hand suffered from the 
difficulties connected with getting a 
backwoods vote out.4 
This was fatally to muddy the waters, for what happened in the 1790's (as 
I will demonstrate in a moment) was less the continuation of the 1787 
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alignment than the division of the Constitutional coalition into its North-
ern and Southern components. 
Nor was Jefferson's portrait adequate even for the 1790's. As Feder-
alist critics never tired in observing, Jeffersonians made the paradoxical 
assertion that the slave-holding South was the heartland of republican-
ism, and the plantation owner the sentinel of representative government. 
Beard, while insisting that Jefferson did not seek to give more political 
power to the poor, never freed himself from the assumption that the 
Jeffersonians—slaveholders or no—were defending economic democracy. 
This then became the source of another series of historiographical half-
truths in the interpretation of Civil War and Reconstruction, giving rise 
to versions of the "Second American Revolution" which hardly noticed 
slavery and the Negro in their emphasis upon the conflict of Southern 
agrarianism and Northern industry. 
My thesis, therefore, is that the failure of Beard's interpretation of the 
Constitution rests essentially upon an error in Jefferson's perception of 
his own time. My concern is to locate the source of that reverberating 
error. To this end I will examine, first, the economic basis of the split 
between Jefferson and Hamilton; second, Jefferson's explanation for it; 
and third, the intellectual origins of that explanation in English eight-
eenth-century thought. 
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Beard wrongly believed that the party struggle of the 1790's simply 
extrapolated a conflict between capitalists and farmers over the Constitu-
tion. When compared to the earlier Economic Interpretation, the Eco-
nomic Origins shows more awareness of the role of slavery and therefore 
less naivete about agrarian democracy. Yet, for example, in characteriz-
ing the Jeffersonian spokesman, Jackson of Georgia, Beard calls him an 
"Anti-Federalist leader," "the famous champion of agrarianism," and 
"the leader of the opposition to the funding bills";5 but does not men-
tion that this same Jackson declared in 1790 that slavery is commanded 
by the Bible and that 
the people of the Southern states will resist one tyranny as 
soon as another. The other parts of the continent may bear 
them down by force of arms, but they will never suffer 
themselves to be divested of their property without a strug-
gle. The gentleman says, if he was a Federal Judge, he does 
not know to what length he would go in emancipating these 
people; but I believe his judgment would be of short dura-
tion in Georgia, perhaps even the existence of such a Judge 
might be in danger.6 
Jackson's rhetoric indicates the inadequacy of any simple equation of 
Jeffersonianism and democracy, as in Main's statement that Anti-federal-
ism was "peculiarly congenial to those who were tending toward democ-
racy, most of whom were soon to rally around Jefferson."7 
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Beard failed to emphasize sufficiently the extent to which Jeffersonian 
Democracy was essentially Southern. Manning Dauer has shown that in 
the late 1790's non-commercial farmers in the Middle and Northern 
states deserted the Federalist party.8 But the original opposition to Ham-
ilton, which played the same role in the genesis of Jeffersonian Democracy 
as had "personalty" in instigating the movement for the Constitution, 
was overwhelmingly sectional. 
The key evidence for this contention is the votes of the Congresses of 
1789-1792 which followed the Constitution's ratification. I think what 
they show is the intricate interaction of interest and ideology in the fol-
lowing three ways: 1) although the South—and subsequently Charles 
Beard—conceptualized the planter as a "farmer" and the regional interest 
of the South as a "landed interest," in fact the opposition which crystal-
lized by 1792 did not include all farmers and was restricted almost exclu-
sively to the South; 2) although the upper and lower South had quite dif-
ferent discrete interests, the tendency was toward the subordination of 
immediate pocketbook interests and increasing concern with the broader 
struggle for sectional dominance; 3) although in general the influence of 
slavery was in differentiating the entire institutional fabric of the South 
from that of the rest of the nation, still there was in this early period 
explicit anxiety about Federal interference with slavery which intensified 
resistance to expansion of Federal power in other areas. 
Upper and lower South, Virginia and South Carolina, differed in 
1789-1790 over tariff discrimination against British shipping, Federal as-
sumption of state debts, and slavery. When on July 1, 1789 the House of 
Representatives voted on Madison's motion to insist that British shipping 
pay higher duties than vessels of other foreign countries, 9 of 14 Con-
gressmen from the tobacco states of Maryland and Virginia voted for the 
motion while 6 of 7 from the rice states, South Carolina and Georgia, 
were opposed.9 When on March 23, 1790 the House voted—in rehearsal 
for the gag-rule struggle of the 1830's and 1840's—on whether to enter in 
its journal certain resolutions in response to two antislavery petitions, 
South Carolina and Georgia voted solidly in opposition while the Vir-
ginia delegation divided evenly.10 Similarly, voting on assumption of 
state debts on July 24, 1790, three of four representatives from South 
Carolina were in favor of sustaining the Senate's addition of assumption 
to the funding bill passed by the House, while 11 of 15 Congressmen 
from the tobacco states opposed.11 
Nevertheless, in the spring of 1790 the various discrete differences be-
tween the interests of upper and lower South began to be overshadowed 
by broader sectional concerns. Georgia split from South Carolina on as-
sumption, voting solidly against it. North Carolina, as its representatives 
trickled into Congress during March and April 1790, aligned itself with 
Virginia on the issues both of tariff discrimination and assumption. And 
while the alignment of Congressmen in voting on the Bank in 1791 was 
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essentially similar to the pattern of voting on assumption in 1790, there 
is the important difference that for the first time a majority of every 
Southern state delegation voted against Hamilton on a major measure.12 
Not only were 19 of the Bank's 20 opponents in the House Southerners; 
not only did Southern Congressmen vote 19 to 5 against the Bank; but 2 
of the 3 South Carolina delegates who voted joined their fellow-Southern-
ers to form for the first time a solid South. In the debate before the vote, 
Jackson of Georgia, Stone of Maryland, Smith of South Carolina and 
Giles of Virginia all said that, consistent with Madison's observation in 
1787, the votes of Congress were divided by the geographical* line which 
separated North and South.13 
By 1792, the whole South had adopted the philosophy articulated by 
Antifederalists in 1787-1788. In the fall of 1789, William Grayson wrote 
to Patrick Henry that Southern gentlemen in Congress were beginning to 
attend to the reasoning of the "antis," who had said that the South would 
be a milch cow for the North.14 In the debates on assumption the fol-
lowing February one Virginia Congressman said bitterly that had the Vir-
ginia ratifying Convention known that a direct tax would be laid so soon, 
and without necessity, it would have hesitated to approve the Constitu-
tion; while another cried: ''This is the very thing which the opponents 
of the new Constitution thought they foresaw; this is that consolidation, 
as they called it, which they predicted."15 In the fall of 1790 the Virginia 
legislature articulated Southern opposition in resolutions drafted by 
Henry, the old Antifederalist, virtually identical with the philosophy 
which Jefferson, the new opposition leader, would begin to expound a few 
months later.16 
The philosophy of Antifederalists, North and South, in 1787 had spe-
cial charms for Southerners in 1790 because the issue of Federal interfer-
ence with slavery had already appeared. Jackson of Georgia, previously 
quoted, expressed a common Southern response to the antislavery peti-
tions of 1790 intermittently debated in the midst of the funding and as-
sumption drama. Senator William Maclay wrote of the excitement in the 
House over one of the petitions. Under date of March 22, 1790, Maclay 
said: "I know not what may come of it, but there seems to be a general 
discontent among the members, and many of them do not hesitate to de-
clare that the Union must fall to pieces at the rate we go on. Indeed, 
many seem to wish it."17 The same thing was true in the Senate. Two 
days later Maclay's entry recorded: "Izard and Butler both manifested a 
most insulting spirit this day, when there was not the least occasion for it 
nor the smallest affront offered. These men have a most settled antipathy 
to Pennsylvania, owing to the doctrines in that state on the subject of 
slavery."1S Thus the Senators from South Carolina, the Southern state 
hitherto staunchly Hamiltonian, were sensitized to the dangers of loose 
construction; and in the House, similarly, South Carolina's staunchest 
Federalist Congressman, William Smith, made a long speech March 17 
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which began and ended on die theme of Federal interference and in the 
middle developed every argument for slavery as a positive good which 
Calhoun would bring forward half a century later.19 Broadus Mitchell be-
lieves this conflict about slavery in the week of March 16 induced enough 
Southern Congressmen to stiffen in their attitude toward Federal power 
to account for the repudiation by the House of its initial acceptance of 
assumption by four or five votes on March 13.20 John Bach McMaster 
merely observes that "from this wrangle the House came back in no good 
temper to the funding and assumption bills."21 In either case, the epi-
sode must have been in the minds of Southern Congressmen as they hag-
gled about the constitutionality of the Bank for a week the following 
February. 
What Southerners counted on in 1787, what they still hoped for in 
1790, was that—to use Madison's words—in only a few years "the Western 
and S. Western population may enter more into the estimate" so that the 
South would have a majority in the House.22 But the results of the 1790 
Census were not encouraging. The Northern majority of seven created 
by the Constitutional Convention's apportionment in 1787 would become 
a majority of nine even if, as the Southerners hoped, Congress appor-
tioned one Congressman for every 30,000 persons. If, as Northerners con-
sistently voted, apportionment were on the basis of one Congressman to 
every 33,000 persons, then the Southern situation would be still worse. 
One or two votes were not trifling matters in a Congress where a switch 
of two or three votes had determined the fate of assumption. In the long 
debates on apportionment between October 1791 and April 1792 the dis-
cussion, as at the Constitutional Convention, began with abstract politi-
cal theory, moved on to the interests of small and large states, and ended 
on the conflict between North and South. Never had sectionalism been 
so forcefully articulated. Williamson of North Carolina said the South 
"had suffered so much under the harrow of speculation" that he hoped it 
would not be denied the proportion of representation to which it was en-
titled. Murry of Maryland noted that the long debate had been "entirely 
constructed on the tenets of Northern and Southern interests and influ-
ence." Sedgwick of Massachusetts said still more sweepingly that "there 
existed an opinion of an opposition of interests between the Northern 
and Southern states. The influence of this opinion had been felt in the 
discussion of every important question which had come under the con-
sideration of the Legislature." Summing up, William Branch Giles ar-
gued that a larger Congress would be more sympathetic to "the landed 
interest" and that "he felt a conviction that the agricultural or equalizing 
interest was nearly the same throughout all parts of the United States." 
He was wrong: 31 of the 34 votes for a smaller House came from the 
North; 25 of their 30 opponents were Southerners.23 
Thus while one theme of these first Federalist years is Hamilton's pro-
motion of his closely-coordinated measures to enhance public credit, a 
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second theme is the resurrection of that chronic sectional antagonism 
which had plagued both the Continental Congress and Constitutional 
Convention. If from the first standpoint we can view these years as the 
completion of the Union, from the second we must see them as prefigur-
ing its dissolution. Joseph Charles says of Congressional response to 
Hamilton's financial bills: "A sharp sectional division appeared in the 
voting upon the measures of that program, a division which foreshadowed 
the first phase in the growth of national parties."24 John C. Miller's 
summary states explicitly: 
The gravest weakness of the Federalists was that their 
power was based upon a coalition of northern businessmen 
and southern planters. In all probability, this uneasy alli-
ance would have succumbed sooner or later to the strains 
and stresses generated by the divergent economic interests 
and social and political attitudes of Northerners and South-
erners. As might be expected, victory—in this case, the 
adoption of the Constitution—hastened the dissolution of 
the coalition, but the event was not ensured until 1790, 
when Hamilton launched his fiscal and economic pro-
grams.25 
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Jefferson persistently misunderstood the developing party conflict. 
From 1791 until his election to the Presidency Jefferson believed that 
Hamilton and his associates were attempting to create an American mon-
archy. Historians have found this view of American realities somewhat 
puzzling, if not paranoid. After all due allowance for the energy, devi-
ousness and admiration of things English of Secretary Hamilton, there 
clings to the Jeffersonian rhetoric of the '90's something excessive for 
which Douglass Adair uses the word "obsession."26 
What might be called Jefferson's proto-Populism after 1791 is all the 
more odd when contrasted with his temperate pragmatism in 1790, the 
first year back from France. In his correspondence of that year there was 
no dichotomy of "purity" and corrupt "interest." Jefferson wrote to La-
fayette in April, 1790: "I think, with others, that nations are to be gov-
erned according to their own interest; but I am convinced that it is their 
interest, in the long run, to be grateful, faithful to their engagements 
even in the worst of circumstances, and honorable and generous always." 
As in foreign affairs, so in domestic. "Energy in our government" was, 
as yet, welcome. Writing to the former Antifederalist, George Mason, 
about assumption and the location of the national capital, Jefferson said 
in June: "In general I think it necessary to give as well as take in a gov-
ernment like ours." Although funding would require direct taxation by 
the general government, "this, tho' an evil, is a less one than any of the 
others" which might result from the assumption crisis in Congress.27 
After as before his famous understanding with Hamilton, Jefferson 
was mentally prepared for compromise. He wrote to Francis Eppes on 
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Independence Day: "I see the necessity of sacrificing our opinions some 
times to the opinions of others for the sake of harmony"; and told the 
same correspondent three weeks later: "It [assumption] is a measure of 
necessity." The mood, in another letter of late July, was still essentially 
that of successful North-South bargaining as in 1787: 
I saw the first proposition for this assumption with as much 
aversion as any man, but the development of circumstances 
have convinced me that if it is obdurately rejected, some-
thing much worse will happen. Considering it therefore as 
one of the cases in which mutual sacrifice & accomodation is 
necessary, I shall see it pass with acquiescence.28 
Writing again to Mason in February, 1791, Jefferson had adopted a 
new vocabulary. Give and take, the lesser evil, "necessity" and "mutual 
accomodation" had given way to the perils of "sect" and "heresy," to a 
contest of "stock-jobbers" with the "untainted" mass. Fifteen months 
later, in his letter urging Washington to serve a second term, Jefferson 
added "profit . . . taken out of the pockets of the people," "barren" capi-
tal, a "corrupt squadron" of bribed Congressmen, and the explicit charge 
that the American monarchists, foiled at the 1787 Convention, "are still 
eager after their object, and are predisposing every thing for it's ultimate 
attainment." Jefferson had come to regard his opponents as "Conspira-
tors against human liberty."29 
Why this change? Hamilton had brought in bills for an excise and a 
national bank. In themselves, however, these laws do not explain so 
startling an alteration in ideological Gestalt. Something symbolic about 
the measures beyond their financial consequences or their widespread 
unpopularity in the South, triggered an opposition ideology latent in Jef-
ferson's mind. As when the pieces of a kaleideiscope are shaken and, al-
though themselves unaltered, settle into parts of an entirely new pattern, 
so Jefferson reverted to a pre-Revolutionary mindset. His tone was no 
longer common-sensical, for he felt that he no longer shared the consensus 
of those who governed. Once more the world seemed divided into Whigs 
and Tories, conspirators and counter-conspirators. 
The detection of conspiracy in high places was a major preoccupation 
of eighteenth century politics.30 Jefferson himself, using language bor-
rowed from the Glorious Revolution, had discerned behind the "long 
train of abuses" committed by the government of George III a fixed "de-
sign" of enslavement. "Excise" and "bank" were words charged with 
conspiratorial meaning for Jefferson because of their associations with 
English history. When U.S. Bank stock fell in 1792, he commented: "No 
man of reflection who had ever attended to the south sea bubble, in Eng-
land, or that of Law in France, and who aj)plied the lessons of the past to 
the present time, could fail to foresee the issue tho' he might not calculate 
the moment at which it would happen."31 Political results, more serious 
than financial ones, could be predicted on the basis of the same analogy. 
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Rome furnished the archetypal plot of republican corruption; viewed 
with Rome in mind, English history of the previous hundred years 
seemed one long tale of wicked kings and ministers using profits and of-
fices provided by an inflated public debt to corrupt the representatives of 
the people. English "independent Whigs" or "commonwealthmen," such 
as those dogged investigators of South Sea bubbles and Papist plots, 
Thomas Gordon and John Trenchard, furnished Jefferson a model for 
his portrait of the Hamiltonia cabal. As Charles II (according to 
Trenchard) acquired "a vast Revenue for Life" which enabled him "to 
raise an Army, and bribe the Parliament/'32 so (according to Jefferson) 
would Hamilton employ his swollen public debt. 
Yet Jefferson's change of front toward Hamilton in 1791 was not a 
mere reversion to the ideology of English Whigs. Jeffersonian democracy 
linked political alienation to agrarianism: its central image was the inde-
pendent farmer abused by the unholy combination of capitalist and 
bureaucrat. In the writings of Trenchard and Gordon one finds, instead, 
the unjeffersonian assertion that trade 
in a grateful and beneficent Mistress; she will turn Desarts 
into fruitful Fields, Villages into great Cities, Cottages into 
Palaces, Beggars into Princes, convert Cowards into Heroes, 
Blockheads into Philosophers. 
Trenchard and Gordon call for the election to Parliament of persons who 
are "interested in Trade and Commerce"; "give me the man," they write, 
"that encourages Trade."33 Cato's Letters were not addressed to an es-
sentially rural constituency. And that is why the origins of the tradition 
which passed through Jefferson and culminated in Populism, Turner and 
Beard turn out to be Tory as much as Whig. 
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The influence on Jefferson of Henry St. John, Lord Viscount Boling-
broke, has been obscured by the epithet "Tory." Other notorious Whigs 
borrowed heavily from him: John Adams said in 1813 that he had read 
Bolingbroke more than five times, the first time more than fifty years be-
fore. Did Burke cry that the influence of the Crown had increased, was 
increasing and ought to be diminished? Bolingbroke had written that 
"the power of the crown to corrupt" has "increased" and "must continue 
to increase" unless a "stop be put" to it.34 Did Jefferson write that the 
tree of liberty must be watered with the blood of tyrants? Bolingbroke 
had invented the metaphor: 
Though the branches were lopped, and the tree lost it's 
beauty for a time, yet the root remained untouched, was set 
in a good soil, and had taken strong hold in it: so that care, 
and culture, and time were indeed required, and our ances-
tors were forced to water it, if I may use such an expression, 
with their blood. . . .35 
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The works of Bolingbroke were among the first books Jefferson 
owned. He praised them chiefly for their style and for their intellectual 
courage in discussing religion; but in 1821 made the remarkable dec-
laration: 
You ask my opinion of Lord Bolingbroke and Thomas 
Paine. They are alike in making bitter enemies of the 
priests and pharisees of their day. Both were honest men; 
both advocates for human liberty. Paine wrote for a coun-
try which permitted him to push his reasoning to whatever 
length it would go. Lord Bolingbroke in one restrained by 
a constitution, and by public opinion. He was called in-
deed a tory; but his writings prove him a stronger advocate 
for liberty than any of his countrymen, the whigs of the 
present day.30 
Caroline Robbins excludes Bolingbroke from the succession of genu-
ine Whigs. During the reign of George II, she says, "The journal most 
powerfully and prominently against the government was The Craftsman, 
run by Nicholas Amhurst, the disgruntled Oxford Whig, and adorned by 
the effusions of Bolingbroke." The writings of William Talbot, a Real 
Whig, "might almost come from Bolingbroke's Dissertation On Parties 
where the Revolution was termed 'a new Magna Charta.' " And again: 
"Bolingbroke was a freethinker and a Tory, albeit one who could put 
Scripture to his own uses and cite the canonical Whig writers in defense 
of his own devious ways."37 Perhaps it would be simpler to conclude that 
Bolingbroke and the Whig remnant were saying the same thing. But no; 
for, according to Miss Robbins: 
All Whigs until the French Revolution maintained that in 
theory at least tyrants could be resisted, and by so doing, 
justified the events of 1689. This was their chief advantage 
over Tories like Bolingbroke and Hume who accepted the 
Revolution without a logical defense for it.38 
This is just not true. Bolingbroke made himself quite clear: 
The legislative is a supreme, and may be called, in one 
sense, an absolute, but in none an arbitrary power. 'It is 
limited to the publick good of the society. It is a power, 
that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can 
never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to im-
poverish the subjects; for the obligations of the law of na-
ture cease not in society, etc.' [Here Bolingbroke cites: 
"Locke's Essay on civil Government, c. 11, of the extent of 
the legislative power."]—If you therefore put so extravagant 
a case, as to suppose the two houses of parliament concur-
ring to make at once a formal cession of their own rights 
and privileges, and of those of the whole nation to the 
crown, and ask who hath the right, and the means, to resist 
the supreme legislative power? I answer, the whole nation 
hath the right; and a j3eople who deserve to enjoy liberty, 
will find the means.39 
Is there any ambiguity here? If so, Bolingbroke seeks at once to dispel it: 
From hence it follows, that the nation which hath a right to 
preserve this constitution, hath a right to resist an attempt, 
that leaves no other means of preserving it but those of re-
sistance. From hence it follows, that if the constitution was 
actually dissolved, as it would be by such an attempt of the 
three estates, the people would return to their original, 
their natural right, the right of restoring the same constitu-
tion, or of making a new one.40 
Bolingbroke's political originality, and his essential contribution to 
Jeffersonian democracy, lay in his identification of resistance to central-
ized corruption with the landed interest. He said in his last, unfinished 
political pamphlet (in 1749): "The landed men are the true owners of 
our political vessel: the moneyed men, as such, are no more than pas-
sengers in it."41 The metaphor neatly expressed the vision of a commer-
cialized society governed by agrarians. A similar ambiguity inhered in 
Bolingbroke's use of the word "country," as in his advocacy of "the rep-
resentation of the country by the independent gentlemen of the coun-
try."42 What this meant was that the people should be represented by 
their landlords. 
In Locke, according to Adair, the classical concept of "the struggle 
between the few and the many" was "translated into the conflict of the 
few as the rulers against the many as the ruled." Bolingbroke carried the 
translation one step further. 
The idea of the balance of social classes so strong in Aris-
totle, still perceptible in Polybius, almost entirely disap-
peared in the writings of Bolingbroke, the most famous 
eighteenth-century English expounder of the system, whose 
view of the contemporary economic conflict was cast, not in 
terms of the rich against the poor, but of the landed versus 
the moneyed interest. 
Adair concludes that "Bolingbroke's use of 'the separation of powers' 
theory to fight Walpole's use of the funding, debts, etc. to corrupt and 
manage Parliament set the pattern for the Jeffersonian opposition to 
Hamilton."43 
According to Bolingbroke's reading of party history, a unified "coun-
try party" had existed in opposition to Charles II but broke into Whig 
and Tory parties at the time of the exclusion crisis. The country party 
had been founded on principle, indeed a "party, thus constituted, is im-
properly called party; it is the nation, speaking and acting in the dis-
course and conduct of particular men." The Whig and Tory parties, on 
the other hand, were based on "the prejudices and interests of particular 
sets of men."44 (One finds in this concept of two kinds of parties, I be-
lieve, the germ of that intolerance of opposition which Leonard Levy 
has noted in Jefferson.) The sole intention of his Dissertation On Parties, 
Bolingbroke said, was to break down the "ridiculous" and "nominal" 
17 
division of Whig and Tory parties, to reorganize English politics on the 
basis of opposition between court and country, to reduce "our present 
parties to this single division, our present disputes to this single 
contest."45 
Jefferson took from this tradition the identification of patriotic purity 
with the farmer which became a cliché of one strand of American radical 
thought. When Jefferson wrote to Mazzei that "the whole landed inter-
est is republican,"46 he meant something more than that the weight of 
numbers and wealth in the countryside was anti-Hamiltonian. He meant 
also that the nation should turn to rural men for political leadership. 
Like Bolingbroke a half century earlier, Jefferson declared in 1797: 
All can be done peaceably, by the people confiding their 
choice of Representatives & Senators to persons attached to 
republican government 8c the principles of 1776, not office-
hunters, but farmers, whose interests are entirely agricul-
tural. Such men are the true representatives of the great 
American interest, and are alone to be relied on for express-
ing the proper American sentiments.47 
If city people adhered to the republican cause, they might be viewed as 
somehow agrarian, too. When the common people of Philadelphia 
flocked to the wharves to cheer a French frigate with British prizes, Jef-
ferson described them as "the yeomanry of the City (not the fashionable 
people nor paper men)."48 One hundred and twenty years later Beard, 
seeking to explain urban support for Jefferson in 1800, suggested that it 
came from the truck gardeners, laborers and farmers of the outlying dis-
tricts—as it were, the city agrarians.49 
Bolingbroke's vision of a patriot king served Americans well during 
those years when their analysis of the English conspiracy placed the blame 
on Parliament. Thus Stourzh writes of Franklin: 
The American interest obliged him to fight against Parlia-
ment—an aristocratic body in those days—while remaining 
loyal to the king; in recognizing the king's sovereignty while 
denying Parliament's rights over the colonies, Franklin by 
necessity was driven into a position which, historically 
speaking, seemed to contradict his Whig principles. The 
complaining Americans spoke, as Lord North rightly said, 
the 'language of Toryism.'50 
When the time came to indict the "royal brute" as well, only a slight 
turn of the kaleideiscope was required. Burke had shown how to do it in 
1770. One recognized that: "The distempers of monarchy were the great 
subjects of apprehension and redress, in the last century; in this, the dis-
tempers of parliament." One did not deny that the present danger was 
corruption rather than prerogative, or as Jefferson later put it, "that 
fraud will at length effect what force could not." What one did was sim-
ply to blame corruption on the king instead of (this had been Boling-
broke's theme) on his ministers. So Burke thundered: "The power of the 
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crown, almost dead and rotten as Prerogative, has grown up anew, with 
much more strength, and far less odium, under the name of Influence." 
Conspirators were still at work, but they had "totally abandoned the 
shattered and old-fashioned fortress of prerogative, and made a lodg-
ment in the strong hold of parliament itself." The people's cause, there-
fore, only seemed to be a contest between themselves and Parliament. 
"The true contest is between the electors of the kingdom and the crown; 
the crown acting by an instrumental house of commons."51 
In such fashion, a Whig ideology which Tories had transformed into 
political agrarianism was made Whig once more by recasting the chief 
conspirator as the king. The farmer continued as the protagonist of po-
litical purity. And the script came to be called Jeffersonian Democracy. 
iv 
Jefferson's misunderstanding of his time had a long-lasting impact on 
American dissent. Even as early as the 1780's there were two alternative 
sources for an American radical tradition. The first was the agrarian 
version of Whiggism inherited from Bolingbroke, and reinforced by 
Montesquieu (another favorite author of Jefferson's student days). All 
three libertarian landlords stressed common themes: the protection of 
provincial autonomies, distrust of the commercial city, a cyclical theory 
of history based on the proposition that prosperity corrupts. 
The second available vision was the artisan radicalism of Paine. As 
the friendship of Paine and Jefferson attests, agrarian and artisan radi-
calism agreed in many things. They shared a sociology "which divided 
society between the 'Useful' or 'Productive Glasses' on the one hand, and 
courtiers, sinecurists, fund-holders, speculators and parasitic middlemen 
on the other."52 Yet in the long run the two streams of thought diverged. 
The radicalism associated with city workingmen made affirmations—that 
strong central government accessible to the people was more democratic 
than decentralized rule by gentlemen; that common men, whether or not 
formally educated, had the capacity to govern; that slavery must stop— 
which agrarian radicalism proved unable to assimilate. By the middle 
of the nineteenth century in Europe, the historical perspective of a Bol-
ingbroke or a Burke, a Montesquieu or a Tocqueville, was virtually dead. 
In America, sustained by the availability of Western land, Jeffersonian 
agrarianism lived on and became the recurrent ideology of dissent. 
Beard, seen in this context, was a latterday Jeffersonian. The central 
thrust of his historiography was to impose on all periods of American 
history the static dichotomy of capitalist and farmer characteristic of the 
agrarian tradition. What was wrong was not so much Beard's emphasis 
on economics as the Jeffersonian economics he espoused. "Personalty" 
and "realty" were a part of that system, as was the emphasis on conspiracy 
and corrupt self-interest. So too was an ultimate fatalism. 
For all his well-known optimism about human nature, Jefferson ab-
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sorbed and passed on to his Jacksonian and Populist successors a funda-
mentally pessimistic view of history. The Golden Age, when Saxon an-
cestors had lived "under customs and unwritten laws based upon the 
natural rights of man/'5 3 was in the past. Revolutionary America ap-
proximated those conditions, but only for the moment.54 The growth of 
commerce would corrupt manners in America as it had in Rome, and 
once manners were corrupted, the best of statesmen could not save the 
republic. In buying Louisiana one bought only time. 
"Absolute stability is not to be expected in any thing human," Bol-
ingbroke had written. "The best instituted governments, like the best 
constituted animal bodies, carry in them the seeds of their destruction." 
For Jefferson's agrarian radicalism, decay did not hold the promise of 
renewal, synthesis and transcendence. "All that can be done, therefore, 
[is] to prolong the duration of a good government."55 The tree of liberty 
could be pruned and grafted, and this was the duty of men of public 
spirit. History taught, however, that in the long run the rot was irre-
parable. In the last analysis, one stood by and watched the great tree fall. 
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